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How Payment for Research
Participation Can Be Coercive
Joseph Millum, National Institutes of Health
Michael Garnett, Birkbeck College, University of London
The idea that payment for research participation can be coercive appears widespread among research ethics committee
members, researchers, and regulatory bodies. Yet analysis of the concept of coercion by philosophers and bioethicists has
mostly concluded that payment does not coerce, because coercion necessarily involves threats, not offers. In this article we
aim to resolve this disagreement by distinguishing between two distinct but overlapping concepts of coercion. Consent-
undermining coercion marks out certain actions as impermissible and certain agreements as unenforceable. By contrast,
coercion as subjection indicates a way in which someone’s interests can be partially set back in virtue of being subject to
another’s foreign will. While offers of payment do not normally constitute consent-undermining coercion, they do sometimes
constitute coercion as subjection. We offer an analysis of coercion as subjection and propose three possible practical responses
to worries about the coerciveness of payment.
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INTRODUCTION
Extreme Poverty. A pharmaceutical company plans a
randomized controlled trial comparing a new blood
pressure medication with a standard antihypertensive in a
low-income country in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study does
not offer substantial medical benefits to participants, and is
not excessively risky. The prospective participants are
offered a cash payment worth approximately $100 for
completing the study. Most people in the area are
desperately poor, living on less than a dollar per day. One
hundred dollars could feed their hungry children, buy
essential medicines, or relieve household debt. The
local research ethics committee reviewing the study is
willing to approve it but requires the research team to
reduce the level of compensation dramatically. According to
the committee chair, such a payment would be “coercive.”
It is common practice to pay people who enroll in med-
ical research. Yet this practice often provokes concern,
especially when the amount of money is large, the
research is risky, or the study population is poor.1 One
common objection to such payments is that they are
coercive. Indeed, the idea that payment is sometimes
coercive appears widespread among research ethics com-
mittee (REC) members, researchers, and regulatory
bodies (Largent et al. 2012). Yet analysis of the concept
of coercion by philosophers and bioethicists has gener-
ally favored the view that payment does not coerce, on
the grounds that coercion necessarily involves threats,
and proposals to pay people for things generally consti-
tute offers (Wertheimer and Miller 2008).
In this article we aim to resolve this disagreement by
distinguishing between two different but overlapping
concepts of coercion. One, which we call consent-under-
mining coercion, primarily serves to mark out certain
actions as impermissible and certain agreements as unen-
forceable. On this understanding of coercion, it follows
from the fact that a token of consent was coerced that it
is not fully voluntary and so is invalid. The other, which
we call coercion as subjection, primarily serves to indicate
a way in which someone’s interests can be partially set
back, a form of unfreedom whereby one person is sub-
ject to another person’s foreign will. On this understand-
ing of coercion, coerced tokens of consent need not be
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1. For an overview of ethical concerns about the use of inducements to motivate research participants and responses to these
concerns, see Wilkinson and Moore (1997).
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invalid. Instead, the claim that a person has been coerced
points to a specific negative effect on her well-being.
We argue that while offers of payment do not nor-
mally constitute consent-undermining coercion, they do
sometimes constitute coercion as subjection. We thereby
propose a partial vindication of the widespread view
that payment can be coercive. However, contrary to this
view, our analysis shows that coercive offers do not
impact the ethics of research studies by means of inva-
lidating participants’ consent; instead, they do so by
altering the balance of a study’s expected risks and bene-
fits. We offer an analysis of coercion as subjection and,
in view of it, propose three possible practical responses
to worries about the coerciveness of payment.
Finally, we discuss the closely related ideas of undue
inducement and exploitation. We argue that coercion as
subjection is morally distinct from both—at least inas-
much as undue inducement concerns incentives that pre-
dictably trigger irrational decision making, and
exploitation concerns taking unfair advantage of some-
one in a vulnerable bargaining position. This is because
coercion as subjection essentially concerns neither
irrationality nor unfairness, but unfreedom. In addition,
we argue that recognizing the morally distinct phenom-
enon of coercion as subjection can help to improve our
understanding of these other moral defects.
COERCION AND PAYMENT
Within the United States, the idea that payment to
research participants can be coercive appears to be com-
mon, though not universal. Official guidance from the
Food and Drug Administration on how institutional
review boards (IRBs) should assess payment to research
subjects states: “The IRB should review both the amount
of payment and the proposed method and timing of dis-
bursement to assure that neither are coercive or present
undue influence” (USFDA 2016). Likewise, the Office for
Human Research Protections says in its IRB Handbook:
The IRB should review both the amount of payment and
the proposed method of disbursement to assure that neither
entails problems of coercion or undue influence. Such
problems might occur, for example, if the entire payment
were to be contingent upon completion of the study or if
the payment were unusually large. (OHRP 1993)
Many IRB members and researchers believe that pay-
ment can be coercive. The Emily Largent et al. survey of
IRB members, researchers, and others involved with
human subjects research found that 65% of respondents
agreed that it would constitute coercion if research par-
ticipants “will participate when otherwise they would
not if offered payment” (2012, 4). When research partici-
pants “feel they have no reasonable alternative but to
participate because offered payment,” 82% agreed that it
would constitute coercion (2012, 4).
It also seems common to believe that the greater the
amount of payment, the greater the danger of coercion.
Forty-two percent of the Largent et al. respondents rated
themselves as “very concerned” by “substantial
payment” versus 4% for “token payment” (2012, 3).
Robert Klitzman quotes an IRB chair:
We used to not allow people to put a monetary amount on
recruitment flyers, because we thought it was a little
coercive: “You’ll get $20 if you participate.” But we’ve
concluded that a gift card for an hour interview is probably
not particularly coercive. If you were to say, “We’ll pay $600
if we can take blood,” that might be a little coercive. (2013, 8)
A small number of academic bioethicists appear to
share the view that payment for research participation
can be coercive. For example, Ruth Macklin writes:
The reason for holding that it is ethically inappropriate to
pay patients to be research subjects is that it is likely to be
coercive, violating the ethical requirement that participation
in research should be fully voluntary. (Macklin 1989, 3)
However, the majority of philosophers and bioethi-
cists who have addressed this problem have concluded
that payment does not coerce. According to the standard
analysis (Berman 2002; Haksar 1976; Ryan 1980;
Wertheimer 1987), coercion involves one person propos-
ing to make another person worse off if he does not
comply with her demand, with “worse off” understood
as “worse off relative to his preexisting moral entitle-
ments.” On this view, therefore, a proposal is coercive
only if it constitutes a threat to violate the other’s rights,
or to fail to discharge some duty owed to the other
(Wertheimer and Miller 2008).2
Thus, the armed robber who demands “Your money
or your life!” proposes to violate her victim’s right not to
be killed unless he hands over his money. Since her vic-
tim also has no reasonable alternative but to hand over
his money, the victim is coerced. By contrast, suppose
that a patient needs an appendectomy for acute appendi-
citis. His surgeon presents the consent form and tells him
that unless he agrees to her proposed operation he is
likely to die. Declining the surgeon’s proposal might put
this patient in just as much danger as the robber’s victim.
But here he has not been coerced. This is because the sur-
geon is not proposing to violate his rights. Indeed, to
make the choices exactly parallel, if the surgeon charges
him a fee for the surgery, he still will not have been
coerced into handing over his money (provided that he
has no right to receive the operation free of charge).
2. More specifically: “A coerces B to do X in a way that
invalidates B’s consent only if (1) A proposes or threatens to
violate B’s rights or not fulfill an obligation to B if B chooses
not to do X and (2) B has no reasonable alternative but to
accept A’s proposal” (Wertheimer and Miller 2008, 390).
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This widely accepted analysis is consistent with
some of the guidance on research ethics. For example,
the Belmont Report—the foundational ethical document
for the human subjects protection system in the Unitd
States—states: “Coercion occurs when an overt threat of
harm is intentionally presented by one person to another
in order to obtain compliance.”3 If such an account of
coercion is correct, then it follows analytically that pay-
ing research participants for participation in research
cannot be coercive, since it does not involve any threat.
That is, the defining feature of a threat is that it is a pro-
posal to worsen a person’s situation, whereas an offer of
payment is a proposal to improve a person’s situation
(relative to not being paid).4
On this widely shared analysis, then, offers of pay-
ment for research participation are never coercive, regard-
less of their size. This is not to say that there can be no
justified moral concerns about such payments. For
instance, low payments might be judged exploitative if
they use the recipients’ bad circumstances in order to
bring about an unfair distribution of benefits and bur-
dens.5 Differently, very large payments might be judged
problematic if they incentivize people to enroll in mul-
tiple studies at the same time, or in studies for which they
do not meet the inclusion and exclusion criteria—both of
which risk invalidating the data from the studies and
increasing the risks to the participants. Nevertheless, this
approach suggests that there is no basis for moral concern
regarding the coerciveness of such payments specifically,
and that the ethical qualms of IRB members, researchers,
and others on this score are simply misplaced.
TWO FORMS OF COERCION
We offer an analysis of coercion that promises to make
ethical sense of the widespread concerns about the pos-
sible coerciveness of payments, notwithstanding the
well-known forceful philosophical arguments to the con-
trary. According to the view we defend, there are two
forms of coercion: consent-undermining coercion and coer-
cion as subjection.6 Either or both can be meant by com-
mon language uses of the term “coercion.”
Consent-undermining coercion is the type of coercion
analyzed (correctly) by theorists such as Wertheimer and
Miller. In this sense, genuine offers are always noncoer-
cive. This is because such offers are never proposals to
violate the recipients’ rights. In extreme poverty, for
instance, the prospective study participants have no prior
right to receive any money or assistance from the
researchers. The researchers’ proposal to pay them $100
to enroll on the study (or, equivalently, to fail to pay them
$100 if they do not enroll on the study) is therefore not a
proposal to violate their preexisting rights. It does not
worsen their position relative to their existing moral enti-
tlements. Note that this is the case even if the prospective
study participants’ rights are being violated by others. It
may be, for instance, that their government, or the world
at large, has a moral duty to alleviate their poverty, such
that their continued poverty constitutes a rights violation.
But as long as the researchers have no specific duty to
alleviate the poverty of these people by means of cash
transfers, their proposal is not wrongful and therefore not
coercive in the consent-undermining sense.7
By contrast, coercion as subjection identifies a respect
in which one’s life can go badly. Part of what it is to live
a flourishing human life is to be free in the sense of not
being forced by others to subordinate one’s own pur-
poses to theirs. Moreover, it is possible for A to coerce B
in this sense—for A to have B over a barrel, so to speak,
such that B has “no choice” but to do what A wants—
even though A does not strictly speaking propose to vio-
late B’s rights and therefore does not coerce B in the con-
sent-undermining sense analyzed by theorists such as
Wertheimer and Miller. By way of illustration, consider
the following paradigmatic example of a “coercive
offer”: B is on the brink of starvation; knowing this, A
offers B food in return for dangerous and degrading
work; seeing no acceptable alternatives, B accepts.
Assuming that B has no prior right to A’s assistance, A’s
offer violates none of B’s preexisting rights and is not
therefore coercive in the consent-undermining sense.
Nevertheless, there remains a respect in which B has no
reasonable choice but to submit to A’s demands and so
is forced to subordinate his own purposes to those of A.
That is, B suffers a loss of freedom, understood as a kind
of independence from subjection to the foreign wills of
others. B is now controlled by A. This is the harm
tracked by the idea of coercion as subjection.
Note that this harm may easily be outweighed;
indeed, it is likely in this case that B’s life goes better,
overall, as a result of A’s intervention (after all, B does
not starve). Nevertheless, there are various specific
respects in which B is worse off as a result of the deal.
One is that B must now do dangerous and degrading
work. Another is that B has been subjected to a foreign
will—that is, B undergoes coercion as subjection.
3. Note that Wertheimer and Miller think that the relevant
baseline for a threat is the coercee’s rights, whereas the Belmont
Report describes the threat in terms of harm. These are different
ways to capture the notion of making someone worse off.
4. We can imagine cases in which someone would be worse off
if she enrolled in a study and was paid than if she enrolled in
the same study and was not paid. Such unusual cases are not
the locus of disagreement between those who think payment
can be coercive and those who do not.
5. Relative to some standard of fairness, such as the outcome of
an idealized market (Wertheimer 1996).
6. The discussion in this section closely follows that given in
Garnett (2018).
7. Where the research is being carried out by or on behalf of a
government, however, it may indeed be the case that the
researchers have specific positive duties towards members of
the research population. On this, see Mackay (2015).
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To be subjected to a foreign will in this sense is to be
(1) forced to act (2) by and in accordance with a will
(3) that is foreign to one’s own. Less simply, but more
precisely:
In doing x, B has been subjected to A’s will if
1. B does x because it is her only way of avoiding an
eventuality that she considers to be
unacceptably bad;
2. A has gotten B to do x by helping to make it true
that x is B’s only way of avoiding this
eventuality; and
3. it is not the case that, in getting B to do x, A is
motivated only by a set of considerations that also
effectively motivates B to do x.8
Condition 1 is a forced action condition. It requires
that B act because she takes herself to have “no choice”
but to do what she does. She has “no choice” in the
sense that all other available options are ones she
regards as unacceptably bad, whether because of unfor-
tunate circumstances or the acts of others. This condi-
tion is met by the patient who consents to surgery so
as to avoid death, by the victim who hands his money
over to the robber so as to avoid getting shot, and by
the worker who accepts dangerous employment so as
to avoid starvation. By contrast, however, when a per-
son on an acceptable salary is offered a better-paying
job, she is not thereby forced to take it, no matter how
irrational it would be to turn it down; and a threat of
something trivial, such as pouring your tea down the
sink, does not force compliance, even if it happens to
be effective. One is forced to act only when one acts so
as to avoid an eventuality that one considers to be
unacceptably bad.9
Condition 2 is an interpersonality condition. It
requires that someone else has intentionally gotten B to
act by helping to make it the case that she is forced.
Thus, a storm may force me to cancel my boat trip (I
consider drowning to be unacceptably bad), but I am not
thereby subject to a foreign will. One cannot be subject
to a nonexistent will. This is not to deny that forced
action is bad in itself: Generally, our lives go better
when we are able to chart our own courses from a range
of acceptable options. Nevertheless, interpersonal subjec-
tion is worse, for in these cases we are not only forced to
act, but forced to subordinate our own purposes to those
of another.
Finally, condition 3 is a nonconformity of wills condi-
tion. It holds that if the reasons for which A gets B to act
are fully subsumed by the reasons for which B acts, then
A’s will is not relevantly foreign to B. To illustrate:
Suppose that A gives B some desperately needed money
out of charity. In accepting the gift, it may be that B is
thereby forced to comply with A’s will. Yet B is not sub-
jected to a foreign will. This is because A’s aim in getting
B to accept the gift, and B’s aim in accepting it, are pre-
cisely the same: improvement of B’s financial situation.
Where this conformity in wills obtains, then, there is no
subjection to a foreign will.10
Note that interpersonal subjection may come in
degrees. For example, if A’s and B’s wills are in substan-
tial but imperfect conformity, B may be subject to A’s
will but only to a small degree.11 Thus suppose that in
addition to (genuinely) wanting to help B with her char-
itable gift, A also aims to impress C with her generos-
ity—an additional aim not shared by B. In this case, B is
strictly speaking subjected to A’s will: In effect, A forces
B to help her to look good. Nevertheless, if impressing C
plays a relatively minor motivational role for A com-
pared with the aim of helping B, then A’s will may still
be in substantial conformity with B’s, and B may there-
fore be subjected to a relatively minor extent. By con-
trast, if A’s main purpose is to impress C, with
benefitting B merely an afterthought, then B may be sub-
jected to a relatively large extent. In short: To the extent
to which A acts for reasons shared by B, B is to that
extent not subject to A’s foreign will.
To be subject to a foreign will, therefore, is to be
forced to subordinate one’s own purposes to the
unshared purposes of another. To be coerced is to be
subjected to a foreign will to some significant extent. On
our analysis, coercion as subjection therefore substan-
tially overlaps with, but is nevertheless importantly dis-
tinct from, the consent-undermining coercion analyzed
by theorists such as Wertheimer and Miller.12
Specifically, while the two types of coercion typically
coincide in standard threat cases like that of the armed
robber (who both proposes to violate your rights and
subjects you to her foreign will), they frequently come
apart in cases involving what might be termed “coercive
offers.” It is to the latter that we now turn.
8. This analysis leaves out a number of complexities, including
those arising from the possibility of bluffs. For a more complete
version, see Garnett (2018).
9. For helpful analysis of this idea in the context of exploitative
offers, see Mikhail Valdman’s analysis of “unacceptable non-
transaction costs” (Valdman 2009, 9–10).
10. This means that whether or not someone is coerced in this
sense depends on the subjective mental states of both parties—
if in fact they act for the same reasons, then there is no
coercion. Likewise, whether the person being coerced feels as
though she is coerced will partly depend on why she thinks the
coercer is acting.
11. The degree of interpersonal subjection may depend also on
(a) the badness of the unacceptable alternative and (b) the
specificity of x.
12. That coercion as subjection does not suffice by itself for a
failure of consent is shown by the case of the appendectomy,
discussed in the preceding: One is able to give valid consent to
such a procedure, despite the fact that in doing so one may be
subject to the foreign will of the surgeon. See also the case of
natural history, discussed in the following.
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COERCION AS SUBJECTION AND PAYMENT FOR
RESEARCH PARTICIPATION
To see the relevance of distinguishing these two senses of
coercion in the context of payment for research participa-
tion, return to the case of extreme poverty. As we saw in
the first section, there appears to be deep and widespread
disagreement within the research ethics community about
whether cases like this involve coercion. This disagree-
ment may be understood and resolved, we claim, by tak-
ing its parties to be concerned with distinct forms of
coercion that carry different kinds of moral force.13
Assuming that the researchers do not have a prior
duty to give the prospective participants $100, the offer of
payment is not coercive in the consent-undermining
sense. The proposal to give them $100 conditional on tak-
ing part in the hypertension study does not violate their
preexisting rights, and is not a threat but an offer. It is
therefore not coercive in a sense that undermines the vol-
untariness or the validity of the participants’ consent.
However, if there are no viable alternative ways for a
prospective participant to alleviate his poverty, it is very
likely that the payment involves coercion as subjection. In
particular, it will involve such coercion whenever the fol-
lowing are true (each corresponds to one of the conditions
of the account presented in the third section):
1. The participant enrolls in the study because this is
his only way of avoiding an eventuality that he
considers to be unacceptably bad (e.g. the
unmitigated effects of continued dire poverty);
2. the researchers have gotten the participant to enroll
in the study by helping to make it true, by making
their offer, that enrolling is the participant’s only
way of avoiding continued dire poverty; and
3. in getting the participant to enroll, the researchers are
not motivated by a set of considerations that also
effectively motivate the participant to enroll (e.g., the
researchers are motivated by scientific considerations,
whereas the participant is motivated by financial
considerations).
It is highly plausible to suppose that all of conditions
1–3 hold with respect to the majority of participants in
the case of extreme poverty. This analysis therefore vin-
dicates the REC chair’s view that the payment would be
coercive in a morally relevant sense.
However, payment for research participation will
rarely meet all three conditions. In many cases, condition
1 will not be met: that is, participants will not take par-
ticipation to be their only way of avoiding unacceptable
alternatives. Consider the following case:
Challenge study. A U.S. medical center is enrolling healthy
volunteers between 18 and 30 for an influenza challenge
study to characterize the natural history and pathogenesis
of human influenza virus. Participants remain as inpatients
for up to 10 days and undergo a variety of invasive and
noninvasive tests. The study pays $5000. Most participants
are expected to be college students.
Studies like this also tend to provoke ethical concern.
Participants are paid a substantial amount of money to
take on the risks and burdens of the study, and it would
be wishful thinking to suppose that any would be in the
study were it not for the money. However, we judge it
unlikely that the payment would be coercive. For most
students in high-income countries the alternative to
receiving $5000 might be markedly worse—they might
have to take on more student debt or work a job they
would rather not do—but these are not alternatives that
they are likely to consider unacceptable in the relevant
sense.14 Such studies are therefore not typically coercive
in either the consent-undermining sense or the subjection
sense, and concerns about their coerciveness are
indeed misplaced.
In other cases, condition 3 will not be met: that is,
participants will have motives for enrolling in the study
that align with the motives of the researchers. As an
example, consider the following:
Phase 1 treatment study. An academic medical center is
enrolling patients in the late stages of a rare degenerative
neurological disorder into a phase 1 study. The study gives
participants escalating doses of an experimental treatment
in order to ascertain the drug’s dose-limiting toxicity.
Benefit is possible, but unlikely. Nevertheless, patients with
the disorder are eager to enroll. It is a close-knit patient
population and many of them are highly committed to
developing a cure for future sufferers.
In this case, participants have no good alternatives to
study participation, since there are no proven treatments
for their condition and they are expected to die without
intervention. However, offering the option of study par-
ticipation does not constitute coercion as subjection
because the researchers’ aim in getting the patients to
enroll matches one of the patients’ central aims in
13. More specifically, our view is that ordinary
(nonphilosophical) talk about coercion is generally ambiguous
with respect to the two underlying moral concepts
distinguished here, i.e., consent-undermining coercion and
coercion as subjection. While previous philosophical work on
the topic has succeeded in isolating the first of these and
making it precise, this article aims to do the same with the
second. In both cases, some revision of ordinary usage is
unavoidably required. Thus, our claim is not that people have
all along been employing one concept (coercion as subjection) in
a fully coherent way while philosophers have been mistakenly
analyzing a different one (consent-undermining coercion). It is
that people have been semi-incoherently employing a mixture
of both concepts, and that the best way of making philosophical
sense of this is by providing a clear account of the two and the
relationship between them.
14. Of course, there may be individual exceptions, such as
someone with pressing debts to pay off or someone who would
have to drop out of college without the money.
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enrolling: benefit to future patients. This conformity of
wills between the patients and the researchers means
that although the patients have “no choice” but to com-
ply with the researchers’ wills, those wills are not rele-
vantly foreign to their own.15
FROM BAD TO WRONG?
We have argued that coercion as subjection is bad for
the person who is coerced: All else being equal, one’s
life goes better when one is not subjected to a foreign
will. But the fact that it is in one respect bad for some-
one to be subjected to a foreign will does not entail that
all acts of coercion as subjection are wrongful.
In most philosophical and bioethical treatments of
the coerciveness (or otherwise) of payment for research
participation, the moral significance of coercion is taken
to bear on consent. That is, in these discussions the ques-
tion “Is payment coercive?” is taken to be morally
important insofar as it bears on the question “Does pay-
ment invalidate consent?” But the type of coercion that
has this moral force is the consent-undermining type
and, for reasons we reviewed in the preceding, payment
is generally not coercive in this sense.
The moral force of coercion as subjection, by contrast,
is not that it undermines consent. Instead, it is that it
constitutes a particular kind of harm. In this sense, the
question “Is payment coercive?” is morally important
inasmuch as it bears on the question “Is there a respect
in which payment is bad for the research participants?”
RECs routinely make assessments of the expected
harms and benefits of the studies they review and may
prohibit studies that they deem excessively risky, even
when the participants are all anticipated to be consenting
adults. However, the fact that a study poses some risk to
participants is not regarded as sufficient reason to dis-
allow it. A research study can be ethical if either the risks
to participants are outweighed by the expected benefits
or the net risks to participants are justified by the social
value of the knowledge that is expected to result. Thus,
the mere fact that a research study is or is likely to be
harmful to its participants in certain respects does not
automatically render that study unethical.
Coercion as subjection is no different from other
harms in this respect: Some acts that are coercive in this
sense are nevertheless clearly permissible. To see this,
consider the following:
Natural History. A natural history study is enrolling people
with HIV/AIDS who have low CD4 counts. They are put
onto antiretroviral treatment and their progress is
monitored. One of the primary research objectives is to
collect samples from different groups of patients with
immune disorders in order to conduct research on genetic
and cellular differences between people with immune
disorders and those without. Anonymized data from
participant medical records are analyzed but there are no
invasive study interventions. Many of the study
participants are uninsured or underinsured and would not
be able to access treatment elsewhere.
Any patient who both (a) is unable to access anti-
retroviral therapy outside of the study and (b) has little
interest in the success of the researchers’ immune dis-
order study very likely participates in the study under
coercion as subjection. This is because:
1. The patient participates in the study because this is
his only way of avoiding an eventuality he considers
to be unacceptably bad, that is, not receiving
lifesaving treatment;
2. the researchers have gotten the patient to
participate by helping to make it true that
participation is his only way of receiving lifesaving
treatment, that is, by offering free treatment as part
of the study; and
3. it is not the case that, in getting the patient to
participate, the researchers are motivated by a set of
considerations that also effectively motivate the
patient to participate—that is, the researchers aim to
study immune disorders, whereas the patient aims to
benefit from treatment.
Participants are coerced in the sense that they are
forced to comply with purposes of others that they do
not share: Unless they assist the researchers in their
immune disorder project, they will likely die, and in this
respect the researchers effectively use the participants as
tools for their project. Yet although the study involves
coercion as subjection it seems obviously permissible.
Natural history shows that the badness of coercion as sub-
jection can be outweighed by benefits to participants on
other dimensions of well-being, and that sometimes this
will render the harm of interpersonal subjection permis-
sible overall.16 Indeed, given the size and nature of the
benefits to the participants, the conduct of the
15. Of course, this conformity of wills is unlikely to be perfect.
The researchers may have various ancillary motives, such as
publication or career advancement, that are not shared by the
participants. Nevertheless, to the extent to which these are
comparatively minor motivations relative to the aim of
benefitting future sufferers, the degree of interpersonal
subjection will be low. By contrast, if the researchers cared very
little about future patients and were, in effect, using
participants and their vulnerabilities primarily as tools for their
own career advancement, the degree of interpersonal subjection
would be high and the case would likely involve coercion
as subjection.
16. Note that we have not said anything here about how to
assess the magnitude of the harm involved, but rely on the
intuitive judgment—which we would expect to be shared by
REC members and participants—that the benefits are easily
enough to outweigh the harms. In more contested cases, it
might be that the views of potential participants should be
elicited in order to ascertain how they value the potential harm
of subjection.
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researchers in this case is not only morally permissible,
but most likely praiseworthy as well.17
Return now to the case of extreme poverty. In this
case, too, it is reasonable to suppose that the harm of
coercion—that is, the harm to participants of being put
in a position in which they are effectively forced to do as
the researchers wish—is outweighed by the benefits of
participation (in this case, receipt of $100). Certainly, we
may presume that those who enroll in the study take
this to be the case, or else they would not enroll; that is,
any prospective participant could prioritize her freedom
over material improvement simply by declining the
offer. But from the fact that the study is overall benefi-
cial to its participants, does it follow that the study is
ethically permissible?
It does not. Independent of the question of coercion,
in performing a risk–benefit assessment for a proposed
study, we cannot simply aggregate the expected benefits
and harms and judge the study permissible whenever it
has expected net benefits for participants. This approach
would not ensure that risks are minimized or that the
risks of individual research procedures are justified by
the value of the knowledge to which they contribute. For
example, suppose a researcher proposed to perform a
liver biopsy on a subset of her research subjects on the
speculative off-chance that she would find something
interesting. This would generally be considered unethical
even if the balance of harms and benefits for participants
were still positive overall, since the extra risky procedure
would be unlikely to provide much of value. Thus, a
package of harms and benefits can be beneficial on bal-
ance, but still wrongful. This means that although the
coercion in extreme poverty is almost certainly beneficial
on balance to the participants overall, it may neverthe-
less constitute a sufficiently serious harm in itself to raise
problems about its permissibility. What, then, should the
research team and its sponsor do?
Three responses seem reasonable: We call them
“acceptable alternatives,” “shared goals,” and
“ample benefits.”
Acceptable Alternatives
First, researchers might seek to avoid a significant risk
of coercion by conducting their studies in populations
where potential participants are likely to have accept-
able alternatives to enrolling in the study. Assuming
they have no prior obligation to conduct their research
in a particular disadvantaged population, then conduct-
ing the research in a population that was not in such
desperate need (such as that in the challenge study), or
screening prospective participants with respect to
whether payment would be coercive would mostly
allow them to avoid coercion as subjection.18 This
response will often come at an ethical cost, however. It
is likely to lead to the withholding of benefits from pre-
cisely those individuals and groups who would benefit
from them most.
Shared Goals
Second, researchers might seek to avoid the risk of coer-
cion by conducting their studies in populations where
potential participants are likely to share in the goals of
the research. Even when such studies also involve pay-
ment for participants, coercion will be absent insofar as
participants are also motivated to enroll in order to fur-
ther the aims of the research. This is because the wills of
the participants and the researchers will be in relative
conformity. Conducting these kinds of studies where
possible is another way in which researchers could
mostly avoid coercion as subjection.19
Ample Benefits
Third, researchers might pursue a strategy not of avoid-
ance but of increasing benefits. Recall that consent-
undermining coercion automatically renders a proposal
morally impermissible, whereas coercion as subjection
preserves consent but introduces a partial setback to par-
ticipant interests. Moreover, in cases where the total
package of potential harms (including the harm of coer-
cion) is amply outweighed by the potential benefits of
participation (as in natural history), the presence of coer-
cion as subjection need not render a study morally
impermissible, and can even be consistent with a study
17. For a more challenging case, see Jerry Menikoff and Edward
P. Richards’s description of how U.S. pediatric oncologists have
collectively decided to refuse to offer patients new treatments
that are comprised of novel combinations of already approved
drugs except through clinical trials (Menikoff and Richards
2006, 239–251). If their description is accurate, it is plausible
that parents are coerced into enrolling their children into
clinical trials. Defenders of the trials would have to argue that
the harm of this coercion is outweighed by the social value of
the knowledge gained through the research.
18. Note that although neither necessary nor sufficient for an
absence of coercion as subjection, the fact that a study has been
conducted without any offer of payment, or of only certain
forms of “token” payment, is in general a reliable indicator that
participants have not been coerced to enroll. Payment that
simply covers participants’ costs (such as parking charges)
offers no net economic benefit to participants, and therefore
cannot constitute any means, let alone a sole means, of avoiding
unacceptable economic alternatives. Those who enroll in such
studies, then, do so for reasons other than their having no
acceptable alternative. Similar considerations apply to payment
by means of gift cards that are redeemable for nonessential
items, such as movie tickets. (By contrast, voucher payments in
terms of, say, food stamps most likely would raise legitimate
concerns about coercion.) Our analysis might therefore explain
why many of the Largent et al. respondents thought that a
“substantial payment” was more of a source of concern than a
“token payment.”
19. This then provides a reason in favor of research that is
“responsive to the health needs or priorities of the communities
or populations where the research will be conducted” (CIOMS
2016, Guideline 2).
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being morally praiseworthy. Researchers would still
have to ensure that they had minimized the risks and
that the risks of individual procedures were justified by
the value of the knowledge to which they contributed.
But they might then seek to ensure that research partici-
pants are amply compensated for the coercion as subjec-
tion that they undergo.
In the case of natural history, the outweighing bene-
fits are medical (receipt of antiretroviral treatment). Yet
in other studies, an alternative source of compensating
benefit can be payment itself. That is, the very source of
the coercion—the incentive that gives the participants
“no choice” but to enroll in the study—can also, if sub-
stantial enough, be what renders that coercion morally
permissible by amply compensating for its harm. So
researchers pursuing this third strategy should ensure
that payments, when necessary, are relatively
substantial.
This result runs contrary to a common view, this
being that larger payments are likely to be more coercive
and that the risk of coercion is minimized by reducing
the size of the payment. For instance, the data on IRB
members’ views suggests that where they think payment
may be coercive, they also think that higher payment
makes the risk of coercion greater. According to the ana-
lysis we have given, however, this response is mistaken.
Whether someone is a victim of coercion as subjection is
a function of how bad the alternative to a proposal is,
not how good the proposal is in itself. Someone who is
so desperate for money that she will do dangerous,
degrading work for a dollar a day is no less subject to
the will of her employer than someone who would only
do the work for more than $100.
Not only is it false that reducing the level of pay-
ment reduces the level or risk of coercion, it is also
plausible that one way to compensate for coercion as
subjection is to increase the payment. From the point of
view of the participants, they are worse off to the extent
that they are subject to the will of others, but better off
to the extent that they receive benefits in virtue of enroll-
ing in the study. More money helps to offset the nega-
tive effect of coercion, even though the payment is itself
the source of the coercion.
It might be objected that the payments to participants
should not be regarded as reducing the harmfulness of
coercion on the grounds that monetary benefits are not
supposed to be taken into account by RECs when they
conduct their risk/benefit assessments.20 There is room
for debate over whether this widespread view about
monetary benefits is justified (Wertheimer 2013). In any
case, we think such an objection would miss the mark.
The claim that monetary benefits should not be taken
into account is intended to rule out weighing payment
against the risks of study procedures, such as the side
effects of a drug. We do not take a view on that question
here. We contend only that increased payment can com-
pensate for the setback to interests that the payment
itself may cause (through the way that the inducement
may lead participants to be subject to the foreign will of
the researchers). It would be perverse not to assess the
benefits of an inducement when evaluating the harms of
that very inducement. Analogously, consider that RECs
are encouraged to consider the potential economic harms
arising from research participation (National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979). These might
include, for example, additional treatment costs resulting
from research interventions. It is widely accepted that
these financial risks can be mitigated or compensated for
by providing care, or by paying for insurance or the cost
of care (Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues 2011, 56–62).
UNDUE INDUCEMENT
In the research ethics literature the concepts of coercion
and undue inducement (or undue influence) are fre-
quently mentioned together. However, while coercion
has been the subject of substantial scholarly discussion,
undue inducement has received much less attention. The
literature suggests three ways to conceive of
undue inducement.
First, undue inducement may occur when someone is
presented with an incentive that undermines her ability
to make autonomous decisions. As Wertheimer and
Miller put it: “As a general category, an inducement is
undue only when it predictably triggers irrational deci-
sion-making given the agent’s own settled (and reason-
able) values and aims” (2008, 391). If an inducement had
this effect on someone’s ability to make a decision about
enrollment into a research study, it would undermine
the validity of her consent in virtue of its effects on her
capacity to consent.
Second, some commentators focus specifically on the
effect of incentives on people’s judgments about risks.
For example, Ezekiel Emanuel writes: “Undue induce-
ment is when we offer people goods to assume clearly
excessive and unreasonable risks” (Emanuel 2005, 11). If
undue inducements are incentives that lead people to
take on unreasonable risks, then a further reason for
RECs to be concerned about them is paternalistic: It is
within the mandate of the REC to prohibit studies that
are excessively risky for participants.
Insofar as “undue inducement” is used to refer to a
putative effect of inducements on potential research par-
ticipants’ ability to reason, it falls outside the scope of
our discussion here. We note only that there is no evi-
dence that payment leads to people making worse
20. For example, the Institutional Review Board Guidebook states:
“Direct payments or other forms of remuneration offered to
potential subjects as an incentive or reward for participation
should not be considered a ‘benefit’ to be gained from research”
(OHRP 1993, chap. 3).
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decisions; if anything, the evidence points in the other
direction.21
A third conception is implicit in the treatment of
coercion and undue inducement by guidelines and REC
members. This conception treats coercion and undue
inducement as lying on a continuum.22 As Klitzman
notes: “IRBs also tend to use the terms coercion and
undue influence interchangeably” (Klitzman 2013, 226).
Of course, such a conception simply reveals confusion if
the only correct way to understand coercion is as con-
sent-undermining coercion. But if, as we suspect, the lan-
guage of “coercion” is also used to mark coercion’s role
in controlling someone’s behavior, the continuum view
makes sense. In the context of payment for research par-
ticipation it may be that “coercion” and “undue influ-
ence” are frequently used to pick out the same morally
problematic phenomenon—coercion as subjection. As we
have argued, however, it is a mistake to think that the
presence of this phenomenon automatically renders a
research study morally impermissible.
EXPLOITATION AND COERCION
On one widely accepted analysis, exploitation occurs
when one party takes unfair advantage of another:
Specifically, A exploits B when A takes advantage of
some vulnerability of B’s in order to gain an unfair level
of benefits (Wertheimer 1996).23 In the context of health
research, participants who are poor or in desperate need
of clinical care may be vulnerable to exploitation by
researchers and (indirectly) their sponsors. For example,
a pharmaceutical company might pay a pittance to the
participants in the clinical trials that lead to the market-
ing approval for a blockbuster drug. If it gets away with
paying them so little because they are poor and lack
other options for making money, then it may well be
exploiting them (Millum 2012).
Exploitation and coercion as subjection often play
upon similar vulnerabilities and so overlap substantially.
If coercion as subjection is normally wrongful only when
the compensating benefits are low relative to the harm
of interpersonal subjection—as we have been
suggesting—then coercion as subjection will normally be
exploitative in just those cases in which it is also wrong-
ful. This is because paying a poor person only just
enough to motivate them to participate in a research
study normally qualifies as taking unfair advantage of
their poverty.
These considerations help to explain why a number of
theorists have been tempted by the thought that offers are
coercive only when they are exploitative.24 Yet despite
the frequent overlap, the wrong of exploitation is never-
theless different from the wrong of coercion as subjection.
To see this, note that a research study could be conducted
despite bringing only very minimal net benefit to the
researchers. In such a case, it is possible that the pittance
paid to the research participants might not constitute an
unfair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the
study, and thus not involve the researchers taking unfair
advantage of the participants’ desperate situation. Yet the
transactions may still have involved coercion as subjec-
tion because the participants were subject to the will of
the researchers. Such a study might then be morally
impermissible in view of the inadequately compensated
coercion, without being exploitative.
We noted in the preceding that one way to render
coercion as subjection nonwrongful, on balance, is to pro-
vide greater compensating benefits. In the context of coer-
cive payments, this might involve increasing the level of
payment. As others have noted, this is also a way to
ensure that a transaction is nonexploitative (Ballantyne
2008). Provided that the parties to a transaction receive a
fair level of benefits, the transaction cannot involve taking
unfair advantage. Thus, providing higher levels of pay-
ment may both compensate for the coerciveness of a
transaction and help to render it nonexploitative.
IMPLICATIONS
Payment for participation in medical research can be
coercive. While it is unlikely to be coercive in the sense
of undermining the voluntariness, and hence the valid-
ity, of participants’ consent, it may well be coercive in
the sense of constituting a specific kind of setback to par-
ticipants’ interests—that of subjection to a foreign will.
Contrary to the prevailing wisdom in the bioethics and
philosophy literature, REC members who raise concerns
about coercion in the context of payment are not making
a simple conceptual error, but may be identifying a
genuine ethical issue, albeit imprecisely. We have tried
to make that concern more precise. Our analysis in this
article can help diagnose what underlies ethical worries
that are raised about payment for research participation.
Only once the underlying issue is identified—whether it
be consent-undermining coercion, coercion as subjection,
21. Bentley and Thacker (2004) found that higher payments
increased participants’ willingness to enroll in a hypothetical
study but did not appear to blind them to risk. Halpern et al.
(2004) found no effect of level of payment on patient
perceptions of the risks of a hypothetical study. In their
comparison of the effects of short and long consent forms,
Stunkel et al. report that “volunteers who reported a primary
financial motivation had significantly greater comprehension
compared to volunteers with a primary nonfinancial
motivation” (Stunkel et al. 2010, 6).
22. This corresponds to what Largent et al. call the “sliding
scale view” (Largent et al. 2013, 506).
23. For alternative analyses, see, e.g., Valdman (2009) or
Vrousalis (2013). Note that the overlap between coercion as
subjection and exploitation may be even greater on such views
than on the standard one.
24. See, e.g., Frankfurt (1973), Feinberg (1983), and Haksar
(1976) (all quoted in Wertheimer 1987, 226–227).
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undue inducement, or exploitation—can an appropriate
recommendation be made about how to address it.
When it comes to addressing coercive payments, we
emphasize three points that researchers, RECs, and regu-
lators should bear in mind.
First, and contrary to the views of most people who
raise the issue of coercive payments, the size of the pay-
ment does not matter to whether an agreement is coer-
cive. What matters is whether turning down the offer of
payment will leave a prospective participant in an
unacceptable situation. If it will not—if the prospective
participant is not in desperate financial need—then even
a large offer of payment will not be coercive. If it will—
if the prospective participant has, in effect, “no choice”
but to accept the offer—then even a small offer may be
coercive, and a larger one will be no more coercive than
a smaller one. RECs should not require reduced pay-
ments in order to reduce the risk of coercion.
Second, the fact that an offer is coercive in this sense
does not entail that it is wrongful. Unlike with consent-
undermining coercion, the fact that a study may involve
coercion as subjection does not render it automatically
impermissible. Instead, the harm of coercion must be
balanced with the other potential harms and benefits of
the study.
Third, if researchers judge that a study is likely to
involve coercion as subjection there are three ethically
acceptable options. The first is to relocate the study to a
population that is less likely to be in financial hardship
(“acceptable alternatives”). This option has the disadvan-
tage of depriving people in desperate need of important
benefits. The second is to relocate or redesign the study
so that the population from which participants are drawn
is more likely to share in the aims of the research (“shared
goals”). The third is to compensate for the coercion as
subjection by ensuring the benefits to participants are suf-
ficiently high, which might involve raising the level of
payment (“ample benefits”). Which of these responses is
most appropriate in a given case must, of course, be
judged with reference to the details of that case.
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